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The tragedy of 11 September 2001 revealed two major shortcomings:  the US 
military and the Department of Defense’s inability to respond quickly to and defend 
against the threat posed by foreign terrorists to the United States, and the inability of the 
Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities to fuse and analyze foreign threat 
intelligence with domestic law enforcement information in a timely fashion to provide 
adequate indications and warning of such an attack.  The United States Northern 
Command Intelligence Directorate (J2) has the primary mission in providing accurate, 
timely, and relevant indications and warnings of potential threats to the Commander, 
USNORTHCOM.  The USNORTHCOM J2 must be able to use all intelligence sources, 
including law enforcement information, to better understand the potential threats and 
capabilities arrayed against it.  This enables the USNORTHCOM J2 to provide the 
Commander, USNORTHCOM an all-source, fused analytic assessment of potential 
threats as the command carries out its mission to “deter, prevent, and defeat threats and 
aggression aimed at the United States,” and thus fulfilling the command’s role as the 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. 9/11 AND ITS AFTERMATH  
The tragedy of 11 September 2001 had a profound impact on the United States in 
many ways.  Many books and articles have been written on these affects, including the 
deliberations and reports from national commissions to explore what went wrong, what 
level of impact the attack imparted on the U.S., and what the future might bring.  Of the 
many reports, commentaries, books, and articles, the attack revealed two major 
shortcomings:  the US military and the Department of Defense’s inability to respond 
quickly to and defend against the threat posed by foreign terrorists to the United States, 
and the inability of the Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities to fuse and 
analyze foreign threat intelligence with domestic law enforcement information in a timely 
fashion to provide adequate indications and warning of such an attack.  The Department 
of Defense’s response to the former was the creation of the United States Northern 
Command.  The creation of this command provided a single Combatant Commander to 
have both a war fighting role against foreign threats to the homeland, as well as a role in 
support of civil affairs within the continental United States when called upon to do so.  
The response to the later has been many and varied, with the creation of several new 
intelligence entities, collaborations between existing intelligence and law enforcement 
agencies and organizations, and the creation of collaborative networks to facilitate the 
flow of information between the law enforcement and intelligence communities. 
The creation of the US Northern Command brought with it the commensurate 
creation of its intelligence arm, the Intelligence Directorate.  The US Northern Command 
(USNORTHCOM) Intelligence Directorate (J2) has the primary mission in providing 
accurate, timely, and relevant indications and warnings of potential threats to North 
America to the Commander, USNORTHCOM.  In order to do this effectively, the 
USNORTHCOM J2 must be able to use all intelligence sources, including law 
enforcement information, to better understand the potential threats and capabilities 
arrayed against it.  This enables the USNORTHCOM J2 to provide the Commander, 
USNORTHCOM an all-source, fused analytic assessment of potential threats as the 
command carries out its mission to “deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression 
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aimed at the United States,” and thus fulfilling the command’s role as the Department of 
Defense’s lead command in homeland defense and homeland security.  
One of the greatest difficulties faced by the USNORTHCOM J2 is access to and 
incorporation of law enforcement information into its analysis of potential threats to the 
USNORTHCOM area of responsibility (AOR) and the U.S. homeland. 1   The task of 
fusing intelligence data with law enforcement information would seem rather easy at first 
glance; however, there are several barriers (such as legal restrictions and cultural 
differences) that have developed over time that make this a more difficult and 
challenging task.  The Intelligence Community traditionally focuses on foreign threats, 
outside of the United States.  It collects information via a variety of means, both human 
and technical, and for the purposes of this paper is defined as “traditional intelligence.”  
Intelligence analysts that work within the Department of Defense (DoD), including those 
in the USNORTHCOM J2, are familiar working with this type of intelligence 
information.   
Law enforcement agencies (such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), US 
Customs Service, as well as state and local police departments) also work with 
intelligence information, but this type of data is referred to as “law enforcement 
information.”  These agencies’s primary focus is internal to the United States, trying to 
prevent and solve crimes occurring within our borders.  Again, their information is 
obtained by a variety of means, both human and technical, but this information is not 
ordinarily classified similarly to that information obtained by the other elements of the 
Intelligence Community (noted above) and has legal restrictions that limit access by DoD 
intelligence analysts.  Because of this, this type of intelligence information is defined as 
“non-traditional” intelligence since analysts outside of the law enforcement community 
do not routinely have access to or use this type of information. 
The melding of all available information is defined as ‘fusion analysis,’ bringing 
together all sources of information, looking at each piece in concert with the other, and  
1 The AOR includes air, land and sea approaches and encompasses the continental United States, 
Alaska, Canada, Mexico, and the surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles. It also 
includes the Gulf of Mexico, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The defense of Hawaii and the 
territories and possessions in the Pacific remain the responsibility of U.S. Pacific Command.  For more 
information see the U.S. Northern Command Website at 
http://www.northcom.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=s.who_homefront. [5 March 2005] 
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then developing one complete analytic picture by “fusing” these disparate pieces of data 
into one whole.  The USNORTHCOM J2 must be able to use all intelligence sources, 
including law enforcement information, to better understand the potential threats and 
capabilities arrayed against the homeland.  This understanding is essential in order to 
provide “timely, accurate and relevant” indications and warning to the Commander, 
USNORTHCOM.   
 
B. OBJECTIVES 
This thesis looks at the challenges faced by USNORTHCOM J2 counterterrorism 
analysts as they try to produce products that are “accurate, timely, and relevant,” using all 
available information sources, including law enforcement information.  The thesis has six 
chapters.  Chapter I: “Introduction” describes the challenges created by the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11, and sets the stage for the discussion of the creation of the 
USNORTHCOM and its Intelligence Directorate, and defines the difference between 
national security intelligence and law enforcement information. 
Chapter II: “’Separate but Equal’ Communities” goes further to describe the 
national Intelligence Community and its major elements, and the elements of the Law 
Enforcement Community, focusing on the federal level of government.  It then further 
elaborates on the distinction between intelligence information and law enforcement 
information.  Areas of discussion will concentrate on cultural differences, cooperation 
and communication. In the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before 
and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, one of the major problems 
mentioned inherent in the Intelligence Community was that the FBI and CIA failed to 
cooperate effectively prior to the 9/11 attack which allowed al-Qa’ida operatives to move 
freely within the United States to plan and conduct their attack.2  This dynamic between 
the Law Enforcement and the Intelligence Communities will be further explored. 
Chapter III: “DoD, U.S. Northern Command, and the Northern Command 
Intelligence Directorate” goes into greater detail on the creation of USNORTHCOM, the 
 
2 U.S. Congress, Senate and House. Permanent/Select Committees on Intelligence. Joint Inquiry into 
Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 with 
additional views (107th Cong., 2d sess., 2002), 45. 
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first major unified military command with the primary responsibility for Homeland 
Defense.  The chapter discusses the difference between homeland defense and homeland 
security and  the  roles  that  the  USNORTHCOM  plays  in  each.  The  chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the USNORTHCOM J2, explaining its mission and goals 
and sets the baseline for the need for more law enforcement information to create all-
source fusion intelligence products. 
Chapter IV: “Breaking Down the Walls” explores more deeply the problems 
existing in the sharing of law enforcement information with military intelligence entities, 
specifically the USNORTHCOM J2.  The chapter evaluates the legal basis of sharing this 
data, including a discussion of any legal barriers that would preclude sharing.  In a 
recently published Naval Postgraduate School thesis, Todd Gleghorn points out that 
“[t]he primary reason the conceptual and operational distinctions are made [between 
foreign and domestic intelligence operations] is to protect the civil liberties of the 
American public.  Thus, the rules that govern the conduct of domestic security (law 
enforcement) and foreign intelligence operations are different.”3  A review of Executive 
Order 12333 4 is necessary to understand the ground rules that military intelligence 
analysts must follow.  Similarly, the USA PATRIOT Act of 20015 continued to clarify 
what the intelligence analyst could and could not do with information derived from 
intelligence and law enforcement collection.  The chapter continues with a discussion of 
the cultural and political barriers, created over time, which are the real inhibitors to a free 
flow of information between the Intelligence Community and Law Enforcement entities. 
Chapter V: “Prescriptions for Change” looks at possible recommendations for 
increased collaboration and cooperation across the divide that has been built up between 
law enforcement agencies and military intelligence entities such as the USNORTHCOM 
J2.  The first section discusses the recent focus of information sharing; that is, the balance 
 
3 Gleghorn, Todd E.  Exposing the Seams:  The Impetus for Reforming U.S. Counterintelligence 
(Monterey, Naval Postgraduate School, 2003), 59. 
4 U.S. President. Executive Order. “United States Intelligence Activities, Executive Order 12333,” 
Federal Register 46, no. 59941 (4 December 1981). Available [Online]: 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo12333.htm [20 February 2005]. 
5 Charles Doyle, The USA PATRIOT Act: A Sketch (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research 
Service Report for Congress, 18 April 2002. Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, Order 
Code RS21203), 1. 
5 
between “need to know” and “need to share.”  The recent debate on information sharing 
has hinged on this need to be able to provide all available information balanced against 
the need to protect sources and methods.  The chapter then moves to a brief discussion of 
the most recent reforms suggested by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States, also known as the 9/11 Commission, and implemented by the  
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, and how they will relate to 
USNORTHCOM.  These recent reforms support USNORTHCOM J2 efforts to receive 
all available law enforcement information that is legally available to military 
counterterrorism analysts to receive, retain, and use.    The two stage process to establish 
whether domestic intelligence on US Persons is allowed to be shared with 
USNORTHCOM J2 analysts is tackled, including defining the “reason to believe” a 
connection exists with transnational terrorism.  The chapter closes with a discussion on 
the diffusion of analytic talent across the Intelligence Community and how 
USNORTHCOM J2 can be a vital contributor to the process.   
Chapter VI: “A More Perfect Union” summarizes the challenges of sharing law 
enforcement information with military intelligence analysts, focusing on future reforms 
and the impact these prescriptions will have on the USNORTHCOM J2.   It ends with a 
call for continued reassessment of established programs and policies to ensure future 
information sharing and collaboration across the intelligence / law enforcement divide. 
 
C. WHAT WILL NOT BE ADDRESSED 
Many changes have already taken place within the last eighteen months during the 
research and writing of this thesis.  Because of that, this thesis cannot cover all the 
reforms in detail as they are spelled out in the recent Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004.  Although the reforms of the community, the relationships 
between the members, and the future organizational structure are important topics, they 
are not all central to the discussion of access to law enforcement information by 
USNORTHCOM J2 counterterrorism analysts.  Only those aspects of the legislation 
central to the theme of information sharing will be addressed.  Additionally, the creation 
of a National Intelligence Director, although very important, will be tangential to the 
question of increased information flow to USNORTHCOM.  This position will have the 
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ultimate responsibility of ensuring information and intelligence is widely disseminated to 
increase cooperation and coordination across the community.  However, a discussion of 
all the responsibilities of the new leadership position is not central to this thesis and 
therefore will not be addressed.   
There has been much discussion over the last two years concerning the creation of 
a domestic intelligence agency, separate from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).  
Much talk has focused on the need to strip intelligence activities from the FBI, allowing 
them to concentrate on law enforcement activities due to the different nature of law 
enforcement and intelligence work.6  Although this debate has been put aside for the time 
being, the elements of this discussion will not be addressed as a possible solution for the 
increased access to and fusion of law enforcement information by USNORTHCOM 
intelligence analysts. 7 
Lastly, this thesis is not a debate about the relevance or importance of open source 
material, also known as OSINT.  In the world of counterterrorism analysis, all 
information is relevant to the fusion of a coherent and accurate product.  Additionally, the 
thesis is not about how information is collected.  The threat posed by transnational 
terrorists to the U.S. is not the same as the traditional Cold War threat posed by other 
nation-states.  These threats do not operate in the same manner as traditional enemies 
have in the past; they do not have traditional militaries (army, navy, or air forces) that the 
U.S. military can posture against and prepare for.  The Intelligence Community needs to 
be able to mine all areas of intelligence, to include traditional national technical means 
(e.g., information collected by satellite reconnaissance), as well as human intelligence 
(HUMINT), and those sources of information openly available to the analysts over the 
Internet, in libraries, magazines and newspapers around the world (OSINT).  This thesis  
 
6 See Chapter III and Chapter IV for a more detailed look at the differences between intelligence and 
law enforcement information, as well as the different cultural mind set of how the FBI and the analysts with 
the Intelligence Community treat and deal with information. 
7 The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, also known as the 9/11 
Commission, and the resulting Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, decided not to 
remove domestic intelligence responsibilities from the FBI.  In fact, the Commission stated that “We do not 
recommend the creation of a new domestic intelligence agency.  It is not needed if our other 
recommendations are adopted…”. 
7 
does not place one type of information over the other; it focuses on the fusion of all 
sources of information into one “accurate, timely and relevant” intelligence product 
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II. ‘SEPARATE BUT EQUAL’ COMMUNITIES 
A. NATURE OF THE THREAT 
The 9/11 attacks forever altered the relationships between, and activities of, the 
Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities, raising counterterrorism analysis to one 
of their most important disciplines.  Although the rise in transnational terrorism was 
observed prior to 11 September, neither community responded quickly to counter it.  The 
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet, provided an assessment to the 
Senate Intelligence Committee in February 2001, almost seven months before 9/11, 
stating, “[T]he threat from terrorism is real, it is immediate, and it is evolving.  State 
sponsored terrorism appears to have declined over the past five years, but transnational 
groups — with decentralized leadership that makes them harder to identify and disrupt — 
are emerging…[Osama] bin Ladin and his global network of lieutenants and associates 
remain the most immediate and serious threat.” 8  
Although counterterrorism analysis is a primary focus area for the Intelligence 
Community, it is quite different from traditional strategic analysis and military threat 
analysis conducted during the Cold War and through the first part of 2001.  Traditional 
intelligence analysis, looking at threats stemming from primarily nation-states, is more 
linear in most cases.  This type of analysis lends itself to more static and observable 
indications and warnings.  The use of ‘checklists’ and indicator ‘stoplight charts,’ 
changing in color from green (no threat or normal activity) to yellow (increased activity) 
to red (potential threat activity) is commonplace.  Over the years, the technical side of 
intelligence collection has been the preeminent source of information for intelligence 
analysts.  Counterterrorism analysis, however, “must provide structure to information that 
can be highly fragmentary, lacking in well-defined links, and fraught with deception.  It 
must infer specific strategies and plans from small pieces of information.  It must find  
 
8 Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence:  Statement by Director of Central Intelligence 
George J. Tenet before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the “Worldwide Threat 2001: 
National Security in a Changing World” (as prepared for delivery) (107th Cong., 7 February 2001). 
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common threads among seemingly disparate strands.  And unlike the terrorist, who needs 
only a single vulnerability to exploit, the analyst must consider all potential 
vulnerabilities.” 9  
In order to meet this threat and develop accurate and timely intelligence, both the 
Law Enforcement and Intelligence Communities must work together.  In the past, there 
was disagreement as to whether terrorism was a law enforcement problem or an 
intelligence concern.  After 9/11, there is no longer a debate.  In today’s threat 
environment, terrorism can be viewed as both a law enforcement concern and as a threat 
to the national security of the United States, which is the realm of the Intelligence 
Community: “The need for information extends beyond simply following individuals, it 
also requires knowledge of what is being said on the streets and in the mosques of 
Brixton or Boston – it is doing ‘foreign intelligence’ domestically.” 10  Therefore, 
accurate and timely intelligence from both law enforcement and national security 
intelligence sources is critical to the security of the U.S.  Thomas Kean, the Chairman of 
the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States Commission (also 
known as the 9/11 Commission) stated, “[t]hese agencies are the most important in the 
war on terror – more important than the Army” and that getting them to share information 
is “absolutely vital in the national interest.” 11   
So what is the difference between “traditional intelligence” and “non-traditional 
intelligence?”  The Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the 
Information Age published a report entitled “Protecting America’s Freedom in the 
Information Age” and provided a good description of the differences between the two 
types of information, highlighting one of the greatest difficulties in the different 
approaches to intelligence analysis:    
Law enforcement information is information collected to investigate, 
solve, and prosecute crimes.  Law enforcement is primarily reactive.  That 
is, although sometimes law enforcement operations prevent crime, usually 
 
9 Jeffrey A. Isaacson, and Kevin O’Connell, “Beyond Sharing Intelligence, We Must Generate 
Knowledge,”RAND Corporation, 
(http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/rr.08.02/intelligence.html) [20 February 2005]. 
10 Gregory F. Treverton,  “Terrorism, Intelligence and Law Enforcement:  Learning the Right 
Lessons,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol 18., No. 4 (Winter 2003), 134. 
11 John Diamond, “Panel Now Faces Difficult Task of Finding Fixes,” USA Today, 15 April 2004, 2. 
11 
                                                
they solve crimes after they occur…in the course of investigations and 
prosecutions of suspected terrorists, law enforcement officials gather a 
great deal of information about terrorists.   
The purpose of intelligence is to provide warning, help assess threat 
vulnerabilities, identify policy opportunities, and assist policymakers in 
national security decision-making.  Unlike information collected for law 
enforcement, the purpose of intelligence collection is to prevent harm.  
Because of the potentially devastating effects of a terrorist attack, 
counterterrorism is seen increasingly as more of an intelligence challenge 
than a law enforcement challenge. 12    
 In order to better understand the difference between “traditional intelligence” and 
“non-traditional intelligence,” a look at the two communities is necessary. 
 
B. THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
Intelligence has been defined as “the process by which specific types of 
information important to national security are requested, collected, analyzed, and 
provided to policymakers.”13 There are several ways to describe the National Intelligence 
Community; by function (management and execution); by activities (collection, analysis, 
covert action and counterintelligence); or by which Executive Branch department or 
independent agency each intelligence organization falls under (Department of Defense, 
Department of State, Department of Justice, Central Intelligence Agency, etc.). 14 
However you describe it, the Intelligence Community is a vast network of organizations 
and agencies that collect, analyze and produce intelligence products to support 
policymakers.  For the members of the Intelligence Community, “intelligence means 
puzzle solving or mystery framing that is good enough for action.  The goal is policy.  
The context is a blizzard of uncertainty, often one that cannot be melted into clear 
contours.  And the standard is “good enough to act…”. 15  
 
12 “Creating a Trusted Network for Homeland Security.” Second Report of the Markle Foundation 
Task Force on National Security in the Information Age.  By Zoe Baird and James L. Barksdale, co-
chairmen (New York: The Markle Foundation, 2003), Appendix B, i, iii. 
13 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2003), 8. 
14 Lowenthal, 13, 29. 
15 Gregory F. Treverton, Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press.  2001), 167. 
The Intelligence Community is an eclectic group of organizations and agencies 
with processes and procedures that are at times complimentary, and at others duplicative.  
It is made up of “agencies and offices whose work is often related and sometimes 
combined, but who work for different clients and under various lines of authority and 
control.” 16  There has been no master plan for the development of the community.  Its 
development has occurred over several decades, with the creation of several agencies that 
specialize in distinct areas of intelligence activities of collection, analysis, covert action 
and counterintelligence.  One of the most influential pieces of legislation in the 
development of today’s community was the National Security Act of 1947 which “gave 
the legal basis to the Intelligence Community” 17  and established the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA).  One of the most important aspects of this legislation, with particular 
regard to this thesis, was the fact that the CIA could not have a domestic intelligence role 
or have any law enforcement capability. 18  These roles and responsibilities were the 
purview of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).  This distinction was reinforced 
and emphasized in the 1970s during the Church Committee hearings (a more detailed 
description is provided in Chapter IV). 
 
 
Figure 1.   The Intelligence Community 
                                                 
16 Lowenthal, 10. 
17 Lowenthal, 18. 
18 Lowenthal, 19. 
12 
13 
                                                
The Department of Defense (DoD) controls much of information and data 
identified as national security intelligence in today’s Intelligence Community; “the 
panoply of agencies … vastly outnumber the CIA, in terms of both people and dollars.” 
19  Whether it is the collectors of intelligence (such as the National Security Agency or 
the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency), or analytic units (the Defense Intelligence 
Agency and service specific intelligence units), the DoD collects, processes and analyzes 
most of the intelligence the community creates.  One area, however, that the DoD does 
not provide the majority of information is in domestic intelligence, which is the primary 
responsibility of the FBI and the rest of the Law Enforcement Community. 
 
C. THE U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMUNITY 
The Law Enforcement Community is represented at all three levels of government 
(federal, state and local) and its primary members are police and security forces.  The 
members of the Law Enforcement Community are first and foremost concerned with the 
enforcement of the laws within their jurisdictions.  For the members of this community, 
the collection of ‘intelligence’ is not a primary responsibility.  In fact, for the FBI and 
other law enforcement organizations, “intelligence is instrumental on another sense, not 
for policy but for cases.  Intelligence means tips to wrongdoing or leads to wrongdoers.  
The goal is convictions.  The context is individual cases.  And the standard is the 
courtroom.  It is beyond a reasonable doubt.” 20     
The FBI is the leader of the community, and is the largest law enforcement entity 
at the federal level; it is also a member of the Intelligence Community (see Figure 1.).  
Although it is the largest representative from the federal government in the law 
enforcement community, there are other federal law enforcement organizations that are 
integral to homeland security, including the Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), 
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the Drug Enforcement Agency 
(DEA). 21  States and local representation with in the Law Enforcement Community is 
 
19 Lowenthal, 25. 
20 Treverton, Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information, 167. 
21 Many of these federal law enforcement agencies now are part of the Department of Homeland 
Security, or DHS. 
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made up of State Police and Highway Patrol officers, city and county police 
organizations.  Coordination between the different levels of the community take place on 
specific crimes, or on task forces developed around types of crimes (such as organized 
crime, motor vehicle theft, kidnappings, etc.).  The Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), 
for example, is designed specifically to share information related to terrorism within the 
U.S. between the federal law enforcement agencies and the state and local entities.  There 
are JTTFs at each of the FBI’s 56 field offices, as well as in ten other locations around 
the country.   
   
D. INTELLIGENCE VS. LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION 
To successfully counter terrorism and prevent attacks from occurring on US soil, 
a closer cooperation between the Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities is 
essential.  The plans for the 9/11 attacks were formulated and hatched in al-Qa’ida 
training facilities and compounds in Southwest Asia, but the specific operatives that 
conducted the attacks needed to train and operate within the US to complete the attack.  
Foreign intelligence may have told us about such planning and may have possibly 
identified potential operatives and support personnel, but law enforcement information 
would have to have been developed concerning the activities of the hijackers once they 
were in the US.  The need for a closer cooperation between the Intelligence and Law 
Enforcement Communities is clear:  the globally interconnected world can bring the 
transnational terrorism threat to the homeland, reinforcing the need to combine these two 
sources of information together in one intelligence product.  Prior to and immediately 
following the 9/11 attacks, this was not always the case.  In fact, “some believe terrorist 
acts may have been facilitated by continuing poor information exchanges between 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies and by blurred lines of organizational 
responsibility.” 22  
Coordination between the two communities has been marked by secrecy, lack of 
communication and an indifference to what the other agencies are doing.  Their 
approaches to intelligence collection and analysis are completely different and their 
 
22 Richard Best, Jr., Intelligence to Counter Terrorism:  Issues for Congress (Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 27 May 2003), i.   
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viewpoints on the role and importance of intelligence are different.  Coordination, then, 
and the sharing of traditional and non-traditional intelligence “is likely to prove to be 
very difficult, challenging constitutional limits on domestic law-enforcement activity 
while drawing intelligence officers ever closer to proceedings that could compromise 
sources and methods of intelligence collection.”  23  
The attacks on 9/11, however, reemphasized the need for increased coordination 
and information flow between the two communities.  As the two worlds grow closer 
together (and in some cases collide), many barriers to better cooperation need to be 
understood and removed.  Each community needs to begin to understand the cultural and 
legal restrictions that have been built over time in order to provide better solutions for 
cooperation and information sharing.  In the world of counterterrorism analysis, 
“intelligence agencies work alongside law enforcement agencies that have far different 
approaches to gathering evidence, developing leads, and maintaining retrievable 
databases.  Policies and statutes are being modified to facilitate a closer relationship 
between the two sets of agencies, but closer cooperation has raised difficult questions 
about using intelligence agencies in the U.S. and about collecting information regarding 
U.S. persons.” 24   
 
23 Richard Best, Jr., Intelligence and Law Enforcement:  Countering Transnational Threats to the U.S 
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 3 December 2001), 4. 
























III. DOD, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND, AND THE NORTHERN 
COMMAND INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE 
The attacks on 11 September 2001 revealed a major shortcoming in the DoD:  the 
military’s inability to respond quickly to and deter the threat posed by foreign terrorists to 
the United States.  The primary response to this shortcoming was the establishment of the 
first combatant command on US soil solely dedicated to defend the United States, the 
U.S. Northern Command.  Although all major military combatant commands have the 
responsibility of defending the United States against attack, this is the first command with 
the authority for defense of the continental United States. 
 
A. HOMELAND SECURITY AND HOMELAND DEFENSE 
The first step in understanding the need for the establishment of a combatant 
commander with the specific responsibility for protecting and defending the U.S. is to 
better define and understand the difference between homeland security and homeland 
defense.   
Homeland security is the “concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks 
within the US, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and 
recover from attacks that do occur.”25  The key to homeland security (and the underlying 
concept in the National Strategy for Homeland Security) is to secure the U.S. from 
terrorist attacks, with a primary focus being protecting the country against such attacks.  
This means a comprehensive program across all levels of government to secure the safety 
of the people, the national infrastructure, our economy, and our democratic way of life.  It 
also means protecting it from both domestic and international terrorism, which can cover 
a wide spectrum of potential threats and attack venues.  One of the most significant roles 
the DoD plays in homeland security is that of support to civil authorities.  DoD assets, 
including military forces, can be called upon to support civil authorities in the aftermath 
of an attack to support federal, state, and local levels of government in the consequence 
management of an event. 
                                                 
25 Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security, (Washington, 2002) 2. 
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Homeland defense, on the other hand, is “the protection of U.S. territory, 
domestic population and critical infrastructure against military attacks emanating from 
outside the United States.” 26  The DoD and the U.S. military are the primary player in 
homeland defense and occurring on land, in the air, at sea, and in cyberspace.  The 
primary function of homeland defense is to deter and defeat an attack as far away from 
the homeland as possible; the U.S. military projects its power globally in order to 
accomplish this.  It is also capable of applying military force against those threats in the 
approaches to, and directly on, the homeland.  
DoD has the primary and most significant role in homeland defense.  First, the 
military provides security to the U.S. by projecting power overseas and conducting 
military operations abroad.  The U.S. military is the leading force in the Global War on 
Terrorism, attacking outside the US those groups and entities that threaten to strike at the 
U.S. from within the homeland.  Most international (or transnational) terrorists operate 
outside the U.S. and will have to come to the homeland to conduct their attacks. 27 
Bringing the fight to these transnational terrorist groups in other countries before they 
come to the U.S. has been defined as the “away game.”  If these groups decide to attack 
here in North America, the U.S. military can provide protection with military forces, 
defending the homeland against such attacks on our soil.  Continuing with the sports 
analogy, it stands to reason that this has been termed the “home game.”   
When an event occurs that requires federal response, be it a natural disaster or an 
attack from transnational terrorists, it is necessary to determine who the “lead federal 
agency” is to manage the event for the U.S. government.  In simplistic terms, the lead 
federal agency for homeland defense will be the DoD, and its primary representative, 
USNORTHCOM.  The lead federal agency for homeland security issues will be some 
 
26 The U.S. Northern Command website tries to make clear the distinction between homeland defense 
and homeland security.  It states “Homeland defense is the protection of U.S. territory, domestic population 
and critical infrastructure against military attacks emanating from outside the United States. In 
understanding the difference between HLS and HLD, it is important to understand that NORTHCOM is a 
military organization whose operations within the United States are governed by law, including the Posse 
Comitatus Act that prohibits direct military involvement in law enforcement activities. Thus, 
NORTHCOM's missions are limited to military homeland defense and civil support to lead federal 
agencies.”  For more information, see http://www.northcom.mil/index.cfm.   
27 All of the 9/11 hijackers came from other countries, most of whom were Saudi Arabian citizens. 
19 
                                                
other government agency, not the DoD.  If DoD (and in turn, USNORTHCOM) becomes 
involved, it will be at the request of the lead federal agency in charge of the event. 
 
B. THE CREATION OF THE U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND 
DoD recognized that its response to the 9/11 attack was inadequate.  Although 
response forces mobilized immediately following the attacks in assistance of civil 
authorities, the military response before the attacks was slow, uncoordinated and 
inadequate to meet the threat.  The final report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) noted that “[a]t no point before 
9/11 was the DoD fully engaged in the mission of countering al Qaeda, though this was 
perhaps the most dangerous foreign enemy then threatening the United States.” 28  
Additionally, the Commission found that the Department of Defense and the North 
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), “which had been given the 
responsibility for defending U.S. airspace, had construed that mission to focus on threats 
coming from outside America’s borders.  It did not adjust its focus even though the 
intelligence community had gathered intelligence on the possibility that terrorists might 
turn to hijacking and even use of planes as missiles.” 29  The immediate response to the 
attack revealed that although there were a multitude of military forces arrayed in the U.S. 
before and on 9/11 that were capable of defending the homeland against attack, there was 
no “unity of command,” no single commander to turn to in defense of the country, to 
marshal and lead the forces against the threat/attack.   
USNORTHCOM was created following the issuance of the Unified Command 
Plan of 2002.  The Unified Command Plan (UCP) is a document, approved by the 
President, which establishes each of the combatant commanders and unified commands.  
It sets forth in writing the roles and missions for each commander, their roles and 
responsibilities over specified geographic and functional areas.  As stated previously, the 
9/11 attacks demanded a realignment of DoD’s resources in order to better defend against 
and respond to aggression from today’s threats before they occur.  UCP 2002 was one of 
 
28 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. 
Hamilton.  The 9/11 Commission Report.  (Washington, D.C.: 2004), 351. 
29 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 427-8. 
the most far-reaching efforts to realign and reshape the DoD in over 50 years; not since 
the establishment of the Defense Department in 1947 has the military realigned so 
radically.   
It has always been the responsibility for the U.S. military to defend the country; it 
is a cornerstone in the oaths that are taken by every service member.  Yet, there has never 
been a central command authority to explicitly address threats to the homeland.  
USNORTHCOM is the first combatant command established with the primary 
responsibility of protecting the homeland.  The creation of USNORTHCOM allows DoD 
to develop “unity of command” over those roles and missions defined as homeland 
defense and Military Assistance to Civil Affairs (or MACA).  Its area of responsibility 
covers the land, airspace, and the sea approaches to the United States and its geographic 
responsibility covers Canada, Mexico, portions of the Caribbean and the waters of the 
Atlantic and Pacific oceans surrounding the U.S.    
 
 
          
 
Figure 2.   US Northern Command Seal 
 
The importance of the unity of command that USNORTHCOM provides cannot 
be overstated.  The terrorist attacks that occurred on 9/11 made it very clear that the 
strategic environment we operate in has changed significantly from what it was just a few 
years ago.  We now realize that we are vulnerable to attacks from within – attacks that 




                                                
Most combatant commands have a mission focused on military defense.  
USNORTHCOM is different from other military combatant commanders in that it 
provides both military defense and military support to civil authorities if needed and 
when directed.  USNORTHCOM’s stated mission is to “conduct operations to deter, 
prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and 
interests within the assigned area of responsibility; and as directed by the President or 
Secretary of Defense, provide military assistance to civil authorities including 
consequence management operations.” 30  This mission statement shows the dual tasking 
of defense and support.   
Initial Operating Capability (IOC) is the first capability level to be attained by a 
command to begin operations.  It is by no means the final step, but it establishes a 
benchmark for the command to conduct operations and carry out its responsibilities.  
USNORTHCOM reached IOC on 01 October 2002 when UCP 2002 became effective 
with the start of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2002.  When a command is considered 
“fully operational” and is able to carry out all assigned missions and responsibilities, the 
command is said to have reached Full Operational Capability, or FOC.  USNORTHCOM 
reached FOC on September 11, 2003 – less than one year after its stand-up, and 
symbolically two years to the day of the attack on the World Trade Center and the 








30 U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Northern Command’s Strategic Vision,  (Colorado Springs, CO, 
2003), 12. 
 




                                                
C. U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE (J2) 
Each combatant command contains several different organizational directorates 
on its staff that have primary responsibility over specific areas of concern.  These include 
directorates focusing on operations (J3), planning (J5) and of course, intelligence (J2).  
The US Northern Command Intelligence Directorate (USNORTHCOM J2) has the 
primary responsibility to provide ‘accurate, timely, and relevant’ indications and 
warnings of potential threats against North America to the Commander, USNORTHCOM 
and to those forces assigned to him. This enables the Commander to be able to situate his 
forces to defend the country from external threats, and to prepare to deploy forces in a 
civil support role if attacks occur within the AOR.  The J2’s mission is to “provide 
predictive and actionable estimates and timely warning of worldwide threats against 
North America using all-source intelligence and law enforcement information,” being the 
“eyes and ears” for the Commander and his assigned forces “to ensure [he] is not only 
prepared to react, but more importantly, to be proactive” in order to “both deter and 
protect.” 31  
With the responsibility for homeland defense intelligence, the J2 has a dual focus:  
intelligence analysis of external threats to the U.S. (the ‘away game’) and possible 
foreign linkages to threats internal to the U.S. and the USNORTHCOM AOR (the ‘home 
game’). 32     This dual focus makes the USNORTHCOM J2 ideally situated to make the 
most of the fusion of traditional and non-traditional intelligence information, creating that 
fused analytic picture for both the Commander USNORTHCOM and the rest of the 
Intelligence Community.  The J2’s Combined Intelligence and Fusion Center (CIFC) is 
the key to this fusing of information:  General Ralph Eberhart, USNORTHCOM’s first 
commanding officer stated, “Our Combined Intelligence and Fusion Center collates and 
analyzes data.  Our goal is to connect the dots to create a clear threat picture, playing our 
appropriate military role as part of the interagency team.” 33 
 
31 U.S. Northern Command, Sustained Vigilance: Intelligence Support for North America’s Homeland 
Defense (Colorado Springs, CO, 2003), 1, 5. 
32 The “away game” intelligence is important because transnational terrorists plan their attacks against 
the U.S. outside our national boundaries, and outside the USNORTHCOM AOR.  J2 analysts need to keep 
apprised of data external to the U.S. to ensure that USNORTHCOM and homeland defense equities are 
analyzed in the correct context.  
33 Sustained Vigilance, 6. 
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In order to accomplish its mission, USNORTHCOM J2 must be able to use all 
intelligence sources, including law enforcement information, to understand fully the 
potential threats and capabilities arrayed against it.  This fused, all-source intelligence 
picture enables the USNORTHCOM J2 to provide the Commander, USNORTHCOM an 
in-depth and complete analytic assessment of any potential threats in order for the 
command to carry out its mission of defense of the homeland.  The goal of the J2 is to 
“be a leader in the analytical community by embracing collaboration across the 







34 Sustained Vigilance, 10. 
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IV. BREAKING DOWN THE WALLS 
A. WHY AREN’T WE SHARING ACROSS THE DIVIDE? 
The events of 9/11 revealed the dysfunctional nature of the information sharing 
relationship between the Law Enforcement and Intelligence Communities.  It also 
revealed the fundamental differences between the two communities:  “The law 
enforcement/national security divide is especially significant, carved deeply into the 
topography of American government.  The national security paradigm fosters aggressive, 
active intelligence gathering.  It anticipates the threat before it arises and plans preventive 
action against suspected targets.  In contrast, the law enforcement paradigm fosters 
reactions to information provided voluntarily, uses ex post facto arrests and trials 
governed by rules of evidence, and protects the rights of citizens.” 35  In fact, this 
distinction between the two communities is entrenched within the cultures and policies of 
the specific communities.  For example, Section 9-90.210(A) of Volume 9A of the 
Department of Justice Manual states:  
Although both are arms of the executive branch, the federal law 
enforcement and intelligence communities have very distinct identities, 
mandates and methods.  The mission of the former is to identify, target, 
investigate, arrest, prosecute, and convict those persons who commit 
crimes in violation of federal laws.  The mission of the latter is to perform 
intelligence activities necessary for the conduct of foreign relations and 
the protection of the national security, including the collection of 
information and dissemination of intelligence; and the collection of 
information concerning espionage, international terrorist activities, and 
international narcotics activities. 36   
There are significant differences in the cultures that make up each community, as 
well as legal restrictions that have been established over time.  These specific legal 
restrictions were created to protect civil liberties of U.S. citizens, but the result was the 
limitation of law enforcement and intelligence information cross over between the two 
communities, and the resulting cultures that make up each community reinforced these 
restrictions, both real and perceived.  These barriers are entrenched within both the Law 
Enforcement and Intelligence Communities, and removing them to increase cooperation  
35 Best, Intelligence and Law Enforcement:  Countering Transnational Threats to the U.S, 9. 
36 Best, Intelligence and Law Enforcement:  Countering Transnational Threats to the U.S, 15. 
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and information flow may be difficult to do, but will be essential to provide increased 
information sharing between the two.   
 
B. LEGAL BARRIERS 
Many of the barriers to improved communication and information flow between 
the two communities were erected by Congress to stem abuses by these organizations 
during the 1960s.  Following several scandals in the abuse of intelligence collection 
activities against U.S. citizens, many protective barriers were erected:  “In response to 
these FBI abuses [COINTELPRO in the 60s, against the Committee in Solidarity with the 
people of El Salvador (CISPES) in the 80s], the Department of Justice imposed domestic 
intelligence collection standards on the [Intelligence Community], including the FBI.  For 
example, in 1976, Attorney General Edward H. Levi issued specific guidelines governing 
FBI domestic security investigations.  Congress also established House and Senate 
intelligence oversight committees to monitor the IC.  And President Carter signed into 
law the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, which established legal procedures 
and standards governing the use of electronic surveillance within the U.S.” 37  In fact, the 
National Security Act of 1947, which established the CIA, “specifically precluded the 
Agency from having any responsibilities for law enforcement or internal security.” 38   
Because of these scandals and infringements on the civil rights of many 
Americans during these periods, “in the mid-1970s, Congress’s first-ever inquiry into 
intelligence, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, headed by then-
Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho), investigated abuses of the rights of Americans…the 
Congress’s response was to raise the walls between intelligence and law enforcement – 
for instance, by creating a special court, the Federal Intelligence and Surveillance Court 
(FISC), to review applications for national security, as opposed to law enforcement, 
wiretaps and surveillance.” 39  Based on these “widespread criticisms of domestic spying 
 
37 Alfred Cumming and Todd Masse.  FBI Intelligence Reform Since September 11, 2001:  Issues and 
Options for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 6 April 
2004), 48. 
38 Best, Intelligence and Law Enforcement:  Countering Transnational Threats to the U.S., 9-10. 
39 Gregory F. Treverton,  Intelligence, Law Enforcement, and Homeland Security (Washington, D.C.:  
The Century Foundation, 21 August 2002), 2.   
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by the CIA and other intelligence agencies,” the actions of Congress and the agencies 
involved “served to build walls of separation between the [law enforcement and 
intelligence communities] that were widely recognized in practice even if cooperation on 
narcotics and terrorism was officially allowed.” 40  The emphasis then was for law 
enforcement to focus internally on domestic intelligence activities inside the United 
States and for the Intelligence Community to focus outward on intelligence activities in 
foreign countries.  This alleviated the Intelligence Community on its concern about 
activities that could be considered infringements on the civil rights of U.S. citizens 
because “[i]ntelligence collected abroad on foreign persons does not raise Fourth 
Amendment search-and-seizure issues,” 41 as well as First Amendment concerns on 
freedom of speech. 
The attacks by al-Qa’ida on 9/11, however, showed that terrorism can occur 
within the U.S. and include the actions of persons that may be considered “U.S. Persons.” 
42.  Therefore, “[i]ntelligence collected on U.S. persons, or within the U.S. … [can] raise 
some of these constitutional issues, but when the purpose of the collection is for national 
security, courts have allowed greater flexibility for intelligence collection than for law 
enforcement, particularly when the threat can be shown to be a foreign power.” 43  
 
1. What Does the Law Actually Say? 
Are there actual restrictions which preclude counterterrorism intelligence analysts 
at USNORTHCOM J2 from viewing and using law enforcement-derived intelligence in 
their analytic products?  A look at the governing laws and instructions for military 
intelligence analysts reveals that although there are some restrictions, they are not so 
onerous as to preclude law enforcement agencies from providing this information to 
USNORTHCOM J2 counterterrorism analysts for use in all-source, fused analytic 
intelligence products. 
 
40 Best, Intelligence and Law Enforcement:  Countering Transnational Threats to the U.S, 10. 
41 Second Report of the Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age, 
Appendix B, iii. 
42 The definition of “US Persons” is addressed later in this chapter on page 28. 
43 Second Report of the Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age, 
Appendix B, iii. 
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Following the  9/11 attacks by al-Qa’ida, “Congress passed the USA PATRIOT 
Act, a principal purpose of which was to remove perceived restrictions on closer law 
enforcement-intelligence cooperation in order to support counterterrorist efforts.  
Modifications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) for the same purpose 
were enacted shortly thereafter as part of the FY2002 Intelligence Authorization Act 
(P.L. 107-108)...”. 44 The PATRIOT Act encourages an increased transfer of information 
from law enforcement to intelligence agencies and analysts. The Act “affords the U.S. 
intelligence community greater access to information unearthed during criminal 
investigation.”45  Section 203 of the Act “broadens the law enforcement community’s 
ability to share information” including “previously unattainable Grand Jury information 
with any intelligence, national security, or national defense official when the information 
is of foreign or counterintelligence value.” 46    
There are those that consider this expanded ability to pass law enforcement 
information to intelligence as ripe for abuse, however, “the premise of the USA-
PATRIOT Act is that information about foreign terrorists acquired by law enforcement 
agencies, including grand jury information, should be available to intelligence agencies.  
Analysts would be able to put together the larger picture of groups plotting against U.S. 
interests.” 47  This will allow both the law enforcement agencies and the Intelligence 
Community to get a more complete picture of the potential threat arrayed against the U.S.  
The current FBI Director, Robert Mueller believes that the PATRIOT Act has helped not 
only the flow of information from his agency to the rest of the Intelligence Community, 
but has helped to change the focus of his agents and analysts.  It is his belief that “the FBI 
can now, ‘…move from thinking about ‘intelligence as a case’ to finding ‘intelligence in 




44 Best, Intelligence to Counter Terrorism:  Issues for Congress, 5. 
45 Doyle, The USA PATRIOT Act: A Sketch, 3. 
46 Regan K Smith, “Military Module,” Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (Jul-Sep 2002), 6.  
47 Best, Intelligence and Law Enforcement:  Countering Transnational Threats to the U.S, 31. 
48 Cumming, 50. 
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2. Executive Order 12333 and Department of Defense Instructions 
The fact is that Intelligence Community counterterrorism analysts were already 
able to use certain types of domestic intelligence before the passage of the USA 
PATRIOT Act.  Previously existing law already made it possible for intelligence analysts 
to collect, retain and disseminate certain types of law enforcement information under 
specific guidelines.  The USA PATRIOT ACT did not change or alter Executive Order 
12333, United States Intelligence Activities (EO 12333), which “stipulate[s] that certain 
activities of intelligence components that affect U.S. persons be governed by procedures 
issued by the agency head and approved by the Attorney General.” 49  This order states, 
“[t]he United States intelligence effort shall provide the President and the National 
Security Council with the necessary information on which to base decisions concerning 
the conduct and development of foreign, defense and economic policy, and the protection 
of United States national interests from foreign security threats.” 50  It goes on to say that, 
“[t]o the greatest extent possible consistent with applicable United States law and this 
Order, and with full consideration of the rights of United States persons, all agencies and 
departments should seek to ensure full and free exchange of information in order to 
derive maximum benefit from the United States intelligence effort.” 51  It allows 
organizations within the Intelligence Community to collect, produce, and disseminate 
intelligence for the “protection of the national security of the United States” using 
information “concerning, and the conduct of activities to protect against … hostile 
activities directed against the United States by foreign powers, organizations, persons, 
and their agents…”. 52  This includes domestic intelligence on US persons, both collected 
and disseminated by law enforcement agencies (such as the FBI) or by the members of 





49 Michael P. Ley.  “From the Editor,” Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (Jul-Sep 2002), 2. 
50 U.S. President. Executive Order. “United States Intelligence Activities, Executive Order 12333”. 
51 U.S. President. Executive Order. “United States Intelligence Activities, Executive Order 12333”. 
52 U.S. President. Executive Order. “United States Intelligence Activities, Executive Order 12333”. 
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3. Department of Defense Instruction 5240.1-R 
A second document that is very important in this discussion is DoD Instruction 
5240.1-R, “Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components That 
Affect United States Persons,” which sets the ground rules for the use of information on 
“US persons” for military intelligence analysts.  This instruction, signed by both the 
Secretary of Defense and Attorney General of the United States, expands on EO 12333 
and is the governing document for military intelligence analysts (such as those within the 
USNORTHCOM J2) on how to implement the rules contained in EO 12333. 
In order for USNORTHCOM J2 analysts to see and use information that may be 
considered domestic intelligence (generated from law enforcement sources), two 
important criteria must be met.  The first is the understanding of what a “US person” is.  
By definition, a “US person” is:   
1. A United States citizen; 
2. An alien known by the DoD intelligence component concerned to be a 
permanent resident alien; 
3. An unincorporated association substantially composed of United States 
citizens or permanent resident aliens; 
4. A corporation incorporated in the United States, except for a corporation 
directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments. A 
corporation or corporate subsidiary incorporated abroad, even if partially 
or wholly owned by a corporation incorporated in the United States, is not 
a United States person; 
5. A person or organization outside the United States shall be presumed not 
to be a United States person unless specific information to the contrary is 
obtained. An alien in the United States shall be presumed not to be a 
United States person unless specific information to the contrary is 
obtained;  
6. A permanent resident alien is a foreign national lawfully admitted into the 
United States for permanent residence.  53 
The second critical criterion is establishing a nexus with transnational terrorism.  
DoD Instruction 5240.1-R states that information on US persons can be collected, 
analyzed and disseminated by military intelligence analysts if such person(s) “are 
reasonably believed to be engaged in, or about to engage in, intelligence activities on 
 
53 U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Instruction 5240.1-R Procedures Governing the Activities of 
DoD Intelligence Components That Affect United States Persons (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, December 1982) 12. 
31 
                                                
behalf of a foreign power, or international terrorist activities” or are “in contact with 
persons described …above, for the purpose of identifying such person and assessing their 
relationship with persons described [above].” 54 
As shown, pre-existing law allows the exchange of certain domestic intelligence 
information on US Persons (as defined by law and military instructions) to military 
intelligence analysts.  The USA PATRIOT Act “did not fundamentally alter the 
framework under which DOD conducts intelligence activities-the Act primarily affected 
the law enforcement community.  All the current laws and regulations remain in effect 
for intelligence components.”55  Simply put, the alleged legal barrier stopping 
information flow of law enforcement information to USNORTHCOM J2 
counterterrorsim analysts really does not exist.  USNORTHCOM J2 analysts are by law 
able to view domestic intelligence on US Persons if a nexus with transnational terrorism 
is determined.  The crux of this second criteria, therefore, is the definition of “reasonably 
believed to be engaged” in transnational terrorism. 56 
 
C. CULTURAL/POLITICAL BARRIERS 
One of the largest challenges to information sharing, if not the largest, is the 
“respective bureaucratic cultures, modes of operation, sources of information, and 
oversight structures” and that the FBI “tend to give higher priority to tactical 
information” which “may have to be used in a public trial and its origins revealed to a 
defendants lawyer.  Law enforcement agencies typically work on a case-by-case basis.” 
57  Intelligence agencies, on the other hand, support the national security policymakers 
which “require[s] a continuous stream of information from the CIA and other intelligence 
agencies about world conditions, especially about countries, groups, and individuals 
working against U.S. interests.  There is no end-point to these requirements; even a 
favorable evolution of events…does not mean the end of the need for up-to-date 
information.” 58  Intelligence agencies use, at times, less specific information, and “may, 
 
54 DoD Instruction 5240.1-R, 16-17. 
55 Smith, 6. 
56 A more in depth discussion of “reason to believe” is covered in Chapter V, Section C.1. 
57 Best, Intelligence and Law Enforcement:  Countering Transnational Threats to the U.S, 15. 
58 Best, Intelligence and Law Enforcement:  Countering Transnational Threats to the U.S, 15. 
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moreover, seek rumors and gossip that could never stand up in court.  Such information 
may, nonetheless, provide the best indication of a fluid political situation in another 
country that could directly affect U.S. interests.” 59   The principle difference is that law 
enforcement agencies look for information that supports a ‘burden of proof’ whereas 
intelligence agencies use information that supports an ‘analytic threshold’ to provide a 
picture of the potential threat.  This distinction is solidified in directives and operating 
instructions for the FBI.  The Department of Justice Manual (DOJM) states:   
Although coordination on matters of common concern is critical to the 
proper function of the two [i.e., law enforcement and intelligence] 
communities, prosecutors must be aware of the concomitant need of both 
communities to maintain a well-delineated separation between criminal 
prosecutions and foreign intelligence activities, in which less-stringent 
restraints apply to the government.  Not to do so may invite the perception 
of an attempt to avoid criminal law protections by disguising a criminal-
investigation as an intelligence operation.  The judicial response to that 
may be the suppression of evidence in the criminal case…. 60   
The organization’s leadership prior to 9/11 reinforced this cultural barrier.  The 
Markle Foundation Task Force found that “[t]he FBI is fundamentally a law enforcement 
agency.  Its culture is that of a law enforcement agency, and the system rewards success 
in law enforcement such as arrests, prosecutions, and convictions.  The disciplines of law 
enforcement and intelligence differ in critical ways, and FBI special agents primarily are 
taught the law enforcement view of how and why information is collected.” 61  In fact, 
“[t]he FBI’s traditional reliance on an aggressive, case-oriented, law enforcement 
approach did not encourage the broader collection and analysis efforts that are critical to 
the intelligence mission.  Lacking appropriate personnel, training, and information 
systems, the FBI primarily gathered intelligence to support specific investigations, not to 
conduct all-source analysis for dissemination to other intelligence agencies.” 62   
 
59 Best, Intelligence and Law Enforcement:  Countering Transnational Threats to the U.S, 16. 
60 Best, Intelligence and Law Enforcement:  Countering Transnational Threats to the U.S, 20. 
61 Second Report of the Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age, 
Appendix B, v. 
62 U.S. Congress, Senate and House. Permanent/Select Committees on Intelligence. Joint Inquiry into 
Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 with 
additional views. (107th Cong., 2d sess., 2002), 45.  
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This institutional barrier to sharing information, or for understanding the need to 
go beyond the ‘case approach’ to using or collecting intelligence, has hampered 
counterterrorism investigations for years.  Over the years, “agents were barred from 
searching open sources, such as the Internet, without first opening a formal investigation.  
Agents had a deeply ingrained habit of keeping information to themselves and filing 
reports.” 63  What this did was focus FBI personnel to move “away from counterterrorism 
work and toward the traditional pursuit of such crimes as Mob activity, kidnapping and 
white-collar offenses…’[t]raditional agents who weren’t good on the street were put into 
intelligence,’ said Jack Lawn, a veteran FBI agent who later ran the Drug Enforcement 
Administration.” 64   
There are critics that believe “the FBI’s law enforcement culture is too 
entrenched, and resistant to change, to be easily influenced by FBI Headquarters 
directives emphasizing the importance of intelligence in preventing terrorism.  They cite 
the Gilmore Commission 65, which concluded, “[t]he Bureau’s long-standing traditional 
organizational culture persuades us that, even with the best of intentions, the FBI cannot 
soon be made over into an organization dedicated to detecting and preventing attacks 
rather than one dedicated to punishing them.” 66  The Markle Foundation report continues 
that “[The FBI] are simply not accustomed to – and in fact their culture discourages – a 
focus on a customer other than a prosecutor.  Finally, the FBI has not traditionally valued, 
rewarded, or even understood analysis, which is critical to intelligence.” 67     
This reinforcement of the culture comes from the many layers within the FBI 
leadership, to the point that “one senior state law enforcement official stated that the FBI 
leadership is ‘…still being led by individuals who have a criminal law mindset.’” 68  This 
 
63 Michael Duffy.  “How To Fix Our Intelligence,” Time, 26 April 2004. 
64 Duffy. 
65 The Gilmore Commission, also known as the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response 
Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, assessed the capabilities for responding 
to terrorist incidents in the U.S. involving weapons of mass destruction. Response capabilities at the 
Federal, State, and local levels were examined.   Information on the Commission can be found at 
http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/charter.html   [05 March 2005]. 
66 Cumming, 18. 
67 Second Report of the Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age, 
Appendix B, vi. 
68 Cumming, 33. 
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fear of change may be due to the potential that the release or leak of information collected 
during an investigation would somehow get in the hands of those that would misuse the 
information: “One of the principle reasons that federal agencies do not widely share 
information with one another and, especially, with state and local governments and with 
private sector entities is fear that the information would be leaked to the media and the 
public – and thus to our nation’s adversaries as well – thereby putting lives at risk, 
jeopardizing intelligence sources and methods, compromising law enforcement 
investigations or prosecutions, or violating individual civil rights.” 69  
The DoD does not get off free and clear in this sense; they are also at fault in 
erecting a cultural and political barrier to the sharing of law enforcement information to 
other intelligence organizations, even within the DoD.  The excesses of the DoD 
counterintelligence units during the 1960s and early 1970s made the military intelligence 
community reflexive to separate domestic intelligence and law enforcement information 
away from foreign intelligence.  It partitioned off domestic intelligence and law 
enforcement information away from most foreign intelligence analysts and placed this 
information solely with counterintelligence units (the US Air Force Office of Special 
Investigation, the Naval Investigation Service (now the Naval Criminal Investigation 
Service), and the US Army’s Criminal Investigation Division).  To further raise this 
barrier, these units would look at domestic intelligence and law enforcement information 
generated in the US only if it related to threats against DoD installations, facilities and/or 
personnel.  Intelligence Oversight policies were constructed and put into place to regulate 
and control the activities of military intelligence organizations and units, exacerbating the 
impression that there were severe restrictions on the use of domestic intelligence in 
national security intelligence products and analysis. 
What we have seen, though, is that these instructions have clear guidelines that 
actually allow counterterrorism analysts to view, use and retain domestic intelligence and 
law enforcement information in their analyses.  The instructions that govern Intelligence 
Oversight (such as DoD Instruction 5240.1R described above) set up the two step criteria 
to determine if the information can be used and disseminated to military counterterrorism 
 
69 Second Report of the Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age, 
Appendix B, 22. 
35 
analysts if the connection to transnational terrorism can be made.  What became the 
practice, however, was a distancing from this type of information, a more stringent  
application of the instructions than was required by law which in essence stopped 
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V. PRESCRIPTIONS FOR CHANGE 
A. FOCUS:  ‘NEED TO SHARE’ AND ‘NEED TO KNOW’ 
The key to the discussion of fusing law enforcement information with national 
security intelligence data is information sharing.  This is one of the biggest challenges the 
Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities must overcome:  “We must not lose 
sight of the fact that the purpose of improving information analysis and sharing is to 
provide better information throughout the federal government, and ultimately also to state 
and local governments, the private sector, and our citizens, so that collectively we are all 
better prepared.” 70    The debate has been framed recently as a change from a culture of a 
“need to know” to one of a “need to share” information. As has been described in the 
previous chapter, the greatest barrier to increased information sharing does not lie in the 
law; the legal basis for the sharing of law enforcement information with the Intelligence 
Community, and more specifically the USNORTHCOM J2, already exists.   The greatest 
challenge, therefore, lies in the cultures of the institutions, organizations and their 
personnel that have created impediments to the free flow of information from one group 
to the next.    
After the attacks of 9/11, no one in the Intelligence or Law Enforcement 
Communities will come out and say that they are against information sharing, or that they 
believe that sharing across agencies and communities is a bad idea.  Everyone will say 
that increased information sharing is necessary for the agencies within the two 
communities to conduct all-source, fused analysis to accurately portray the current threat 
picture (i.e., “connect the dots”).  However, the policies and actions of these agencies 
have not always run true to these stated desires.   The ingrained cultural differences 
among the organizations have restricted the flow of information between agencies, and 
even between departments within the agencies themselves.  There appears to be a 
reflexive unwillingness to share information between them.  Agencies have created 
overly restrictive policies about what can be, or should be, shared internally and 
externally.  The 9/11 Commission revealed that the FBI built such restrictive policies  
70 Government Accounting Office.  Statement by Comptroller General of the United States David M. 
Walker, 9/11 Commission Report: Reorganization, Transformation, and Information Sharing. (3 August 
2004.  Order No. GAO-04-1033T), 5. 
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internal to their own handling of information, that the sharing of information inside the 
FBI became anathema and possibly damaging to one’s career:     
… pressure from the Office of Intelligence Policy Review, FBI leadership, 
and the FISA Court built barriers between agents—even agents serving on 
the same squads. FBI Deputy Director Bryant reinforced the Office’s 
caution by informing agents that too much information sharing could be a 
career stopper.  Agents in the field began to believe—incorrectly—that no 
FISA information could be shared with agents working on criminal 
investigations. 
This perception evolved into the still more exaggerated belief that the FBI 
could not share any intelligence information with criminal investigators, 
even if no FISA procedures had been used. Thus, relevant information 
from the National Security Agency and the CIA often failed to make its 
way to criminal investigators. 71 
Many of these overly restrictive interpretations of policy were driven by the stated 
desire to protect sources and methods.  From the law enforcement perspective, the 
holders of information believed that the release or sharing of information would 
compromise a source that could help in the conviction of a case; divulging information 
too early (before a case is complete) could somehow damage the case, or make the 
prosecution lose the case.  For intelligence community members, the protection of 
sources and methods may mean the loss of a technical capability; if a target knows that 
they can be tracked electronically, the target may chose to use other sources of 
communication, thus effectively rendering collection against him more difficult or 
impossible.  This may make obsolete multi-million dollar investments in technical 
collection equipment.  It may also mean the loss of a human source; a compromise of a 
HUMINT source most likely equates to their (and quite possibly their family’s) death.   
The initial attempts at sharing information following the 9/11 attacks consisted of 
increased use of “tearline” reporting, redacting specifics from the intelligence so that 
sources and methods could not be determined from the content of the report.  This 
method of information sharing is important and has increased the dissemination of 
reporting to those agencies that would not ordinarily see the specific reports; however, 
the overuse of redacted information and “tearline” reports has, in many circumstances, 
 
71 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 79. 
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restricted the ability of analytic units such as the USNORTHCOM J2 to effectively 
analyze the current threat environment.  Redacting has become a crutch allowing the 
originator of the report to remove critical details; what is being decided to be redacted 
appears arbitrary and capricious with no apparent rhyme or reason as to why they are 
removing the information.  There is no legal basis for the redacting of information, and 
no community policy for what or how to redact critical elements form original source 
information so there is no specific standard from one agency to the next or from one 
reporting unit to another within an agency as to what and how to redact sources and 
methods.  This creates uneven reporting that hinders analysis. 
 
B. RECENT CHANGES TO INFORMATION SHARING 
There have been several changes in 2004 to increase information sharing and to 
help reform the Intelligence Community.  These changes will have a great impact on the 
USNORTHCOM J2 and its ability to provide all-source, fused intelligence products. 
The 9/11 Commission reported its findings in August 2004 and recommended 
several changes to increase the capabilities of both the Intelligence and Law Enforcement 
Communities in counterterrorism intelligence and operations.  The White House, based 
on these recommendations, issued several Executive Orders in August 2004 to implement 
significant changes within the Intelligence Community.   
 
1. Executive Order 13354:  National Counterterrorism Center 
EO 13354 directed the creation of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), 
the follow-on organization to the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC).  The TTIC 
was created in 2003 and was designated to merge and analyze all threat information in a 
single location under the direction of the Director of Central Intelligence, and 
encompasses elements of the CIA’s Counter Terrorist Center (CTC) and the FBI’s 
Counterterrorism Division, along with elements of other agencies, including DoD and the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  TTIC’s stated responsibilities were to 
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“integrate terrorist-related information collected domestically and abroad” and to provide 
“terrorist threat assessments for our national leadership.” 72   
The NCTC was established in December 2004 and took over where the TTIC 
began.  The NCTC is to “serve as the primary organization … for analyzing and 
integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States Government 
pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism, excepting purely domestic counterterrorism 
information.” 73  Section 1 of the order set forth the governing policy for both the Law 
Enforcement and Intelligence Communities with regards to counterterrorism in that “to 
the greatest extent consistent with applicable law, agencies shall give the highest priority 
to …the interchange of terrorism information among agencies [and] the interchange of 
terrorism information between agencies and appropriate authorities of States and local 
governments…”. 74  
 
2. Executive Order 13356:  Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism 
Information to Protect Americans 
EO 13356 directed intelligence agencies to share terrorism information related to 
terrorism and counterterrorism and designated the NCTC to lead the effort.  It directed 
that those agencies conducting counterterrorism analysis or retaining terrorism-related 
information to “…promptly give access to the terrorism information to the head of each 
such agency that has counterterrorism functions, and provide the terrorism information … 
in  accordance  with  the  standards  and  information  sharing  guidance  pursuant  to this  
order…”. 75  EO 13356 stipulates that the community needs to standardize collection and 
sharing requirements and procedures and to set forth guidelines on how to share the 
information. 
 
72 Richard Best, Jr., Homeland Security: Intelligence Support (Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Research Service Report for Congress, 23 February 2004.  Library of Congress Congressional Research 
Service, Order Code RS21283), 5.  
73 U.S. President. Executive Order. “National Counterterrorism Center.” (27 August 2004). Available 
[Online]: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040827-5.html  [20 February 2005]. 
74 U.S. President. Executive Order. “National Counterterrorism Center.” 
75 U.S. President. Executive Order. “Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism Information to Protect 
Americans.” (27 August 2004). Available [Online]: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040827-4.html  [20 February 2005]. 
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The 9/11 Commission highlighted overclassification of information as being an 
impediment to information sharing.  Specifically, the Commission reported that,  
Current security requirements nurture overclassification and excessive 
compartmentation of information among agencies. Each agency’s 
incentive structure opposes sharing, with risks (criminal, civil, and internal 
administrative sanctions) but few rewards for sharing information.  No one 
has to pay the long-term costs of overclassifying information, though these 
costs—even in literal financial terms—are substantial.  There are no 
punishments for not sharing information.  Agencies uphold a “need-to-
know” culture of information protection rather than promoting a “need-to-
share” culture of integration. 76 
One of the problems raised by EO 13356 is the issue of the use (or overuse) or the 
“Originator Controlled” caveat.  Over-classification of intelligence products and reports 
limit their usefulness and inhibits the ability of USNORTHCOM J2 analysts from using 
the information properly or from disseminating the analysis based on that material more 
freely.  Many products are marked with the classification caveat “Originator Controlled,” 
or “ORCON.”  The ORCON caveat signifies “that the intelligence cannot be distributed 
further without the originator’s approval.  This insistence on control is due in part to the 
fear that without such control, the information will be leaked or inadvertently released 
and a critical source or method will be compromised.” 77  The net affect of the use (or 
misuse/over use) of the ORCON caveat is the limited distribution of information, 
especially to those that may be able to use the analysis to prevent an attack or, at the least, 
to prepare against one.  EO 13356 requires “terrorism information to be shared free of 
originator controls, including, for example, controls requiring the consent of the 
originating agency prior to the dissemination of the information outside any other agency 
to which it has been made available, the maximum extent permitted by applicable law, 





76 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 417. 
77 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Appendix B, iv. 
78 U.S. President. Executive Order. “Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism Information to Protect 
Americans.” 
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3. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
The U.S. Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
in December 2004.  This legislation acted upon the recommendations set forth in the 9/11 
Commission’s report and put into law many of the facets contained in the Executive 
Orders mentioned above, with an emphasis on information sharing and the creation of the 
NCTC.  The Act also creates the position of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), 
responsible for “managing and directing the collection, analysis, production and 
dissemination of national intelligence.” 79  
The Act amends the definition of National Intelligence from the National Security 
Act of 1947.  According to the Act,   
The terms ‘national intelligence’ and ‘intelligence related to national 
security’ refer to all intelligence, regardless of the source from which 
derived and including information gathered within or outside the United 
States, that—(A) pertains, as determined consistent with any guidance 
issued by the President, to more than one United States Government 
agency; and (B) that involves—(i) threats to the United States, its people, 
property, or interests;(ii) the development, proliferation, or use of weapons 
of mass destruction; or ‘‘(iii) any other matter bearing on United States 
national or homeland security. 80 
This feature of the Act is very important because it emphasizes that domestic 
intelligence or information derived from law enforcement sources can be critical to 
national security, thus it is of importance to USNORTHCOM J2 analysts.  Given the 
context of today’s environment, there is no separation between intelligence for Homeland 
Security and intelligence in support of Homeland Defense; they should be viewed 
together, complimenting each other.  For USNORTHCOM to effectively carry out its 
mission to “deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States,” 
and thus fulfilling the command’s role as the Department of Defense’s lead command in 
homeland defense and homeland security, its Intelligence Directorate must have a global 
perspective as well as one that looks at home.  The new definition in the Act clearly states 
that national intelligence “refer[s] to all intelligence, regardless of the source from which 
derived and including information gathered within or outside the United States” and “any 
 
79 U.S. Congress, House.  Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (December 7, 
2004, 108th Cong, 2d sess,. House report No. 108-796). 
80 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 27. 
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other matter bearing on United States national or homeland security.”  This key feature is 
an important point: for the USNORTHCOM J2 counterterrorism analyst to be able to 
“connect the dots,” it must see all the dots, not just some of them. 
 
C. COUNTERTERRORISM ANALYSTS AND ANALYSIS 
The challenge for the USNORTHCOM J2 is to support its Commander and the 
forces assigned to him as they carry out the command mission (deter, prevent, and defeat 
threats to the homeland) and balance this against the need (and requirement) to follow the 
law and protect the constitutional rights of US Persons and information collected during 
the course of legal domestic investigations.  There are important standards that have to be 
met to release or share domestic intelligence information to USNORTHCOM J2, but they 
are not so onerous as to make sharing impossible; once these standards are met, there 
should be no reason or excuse to not share the information. 
If information collected by law enforcement agencies is on individuals that are not 
US Persons, there are no restrictions for the information to be shared with the Intelligence 
Community, including USNORTHCOM J2 analysts.  This information is considered 
foreign intelligence since the individual is a representative of a foreign country, not the 
US.  The calculus changes if the person the information pertains to is considered to be a 
US Person.  The emphasis for the need to share domestic intelligence and law 
enforcement information with USNORTHCOM J2 is the determination of the nexus 
between the individual(s) and transnational terrorism.  USNORTHCOM 2 analysts are, 
by law, able to receive and retain information if there is a reason to believe the US Person 
is connected to transnational terrorism, international narcotics activity, foreign 
intelligence, or is directly threatening DoD installations, property or personnel.  If this 
nexus exists, there is no reason for law enforcement or other intelligence organizations 
not to share this data with USNORTHCOM J2 analysts.  The norm should be to share the 
information, not fall back on an overly restrictive interpretation of the protection of 
sources and methods: “Such a system implicitly assumes that the risk of inadvertent 
disclosure outweighs the benefits of wider sharing.  Those Cold War assumptions are no 
longer  appropriate.   The  culture  of  agencies  feeling  they  own  the  information  they  
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gathered at taxpayer expense must be replaced by a culture in which the agencies instead 
feel they have a duty to the information—to repay the taxpayers’ investment by making 
that information available.” 81 
 
1. “Reason to Believe” 
The key, then, is the definition of “reason to believe” a nexus exists between the 
US Person and transnational terrorism.  The challenge exists in that there is no set 
standard definition for “reason to believe” applied across all intelligence agencies and 
organizations.  The originators of information apply their own standards to determine if 
the information is to be shared, thus creating an uneven application of the definition and 
in essence creating barriers to increase information sharing.   
USNORTHCOM J2 defines “reason to believe” in the following way: 
a reasonable belief arises when the facts and circumstances are such that a 
reasonable person would hold the belief, and must rest on facts and 
circumstances that can be articulated; “hunches or intuitions are not 
sufficient.  Reasonable belief can be based on experience, training, and 
knowledge in foreign intelligence and counterintelligence work applied to 
the facts and circumstances at hand, so that a trained and experienced 
“reasonable person” might hold a reasonable belief sufficient to satisfy 
this criterion while someone unfamiliar with foreign intelligence or 
counterintelligence work might not share a similar belief. 82 
This definition takes into consideration all applicable laws and governing 
Intelligence Oversight instructions to set forth a sound definition to guide the sharing of 
domestic intelligence and law enforcement information to military counterterrorism 
analyst.  The Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities must agree to a single 
standard for “reason to believe” and apply it evenly across all intelligence agencies and 
organizations for all types of information.  This includes the DoD intelligence 
organizations and the applications of their procedures and policies, including Intelligence 
Oversight policies.  The USNORTHCOM J2 definition for “reason to believe” could be 
used for that standard for the two communities. 
 
 
81 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 417. 
82 U.S. Northern Command, Intelligence Oversight:  Summary of EO 12333, DoD 5240.1, and DoD 
5240.1-R (Colorado Springs, CO, December 2004). 
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2. Diffusion of Skills 
Information Sharing is not the only challenge faced by the Intelligence and Law 
Enforcement Communities.  Much has been discussed about being able to “connect the 
dots,” the ability to make logical sense out of disparate information: 
The problem is broader than just collecting and sharing information. It is 
the challenge of using information effectively, linking collection with 
sound and imaginative analysis derived from multiple perspectives and 
employing cutting-edge technology to support end-users, from emergency 
responders to Presidents. In other words, we need to mobilize information 
for the new era of national security we have entered.  83   
The 9/11 attacks significantly changed the analytic landscape in the Intelligence 
Community.  Prior to the attack, the focus of the Intelligence Community was primarily 
on nation-states and traditional Cold War analytic perspectives.  Military intelligence 
looked specifically at the militaries of other countries and their potential capabilities 
against the US.  Even during the rise of state-sponsored terrorism in the 1980s, the 
Intelligence Community did not shift its focus completely away from the Soviet Union; 
although counterterrorism analysis began as a discipline, the analytic emphasis remained 
elsewhere.  The attacks by al-Qa’ida changed this focus to counterterrorism and almost 
every intelligence element applied manpower and resources against this problem.   
Before 9/11, there were limited numbers of experienced counterterrorism analysts 
across the community.  Noted terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman wrote that “People often 
treat intelligence organizations like a bottomless resource, but they are not. There are 
only so many CIA analysts to go around, and they are already stretched supporting the 
global war on terrorism abroad, U.S. efforts to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan, crises in  
the Levant, and simmering threats in Iran, North Korea, and elsewhere.” 84 With the 
advent of this refocusing of effort against terrorism, there has been a high demand for 
analysts.  This increased demand did not equate to increased capability; although there 
are more analysts doing counterterrorism analysis today, they are generally inexperienced 
and not trained specific to this analytic field.  The community was throwing analysts at  
83 “Protecting America’s Freedom in the Information Age.” Report of the Markle Foundation Task 
Force on National Security in the Information Age. By Zoe Baird and James L. Barksdale, co-chairmen. 
(New York : The Foundation, October 2002), 9. 
84 Bruce Berkowitz, “Intelligence for the Homeland,” SAIS Review, Vol. XXIV (Winter-Spring 2004), 
6. 
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the problem, transferring people from other disciplines against the counterterrorism 
challenge and expecting them to be “counterterrorism analysts.”  The 9/11 Commission 
identified this problem, stating “[t]he limited pool of critical experts—for example, 
skilled counterterrorism analysts and linguists—is being depleted. Expanding these 
capabilities will require not just money, but time.” 85   
Because of this diffusion of talent, the Intelligence and Law Enforcement 
Communities must take advantage of all available agencies and organizations that have 
counterterrorism analysts to leverage these capabilities.  USNORTHCOM J2 is one such 
organization that is focused on counterterrorism analysis.   
Washington,D.C., is important. It is where foreign and domestic 
information can often come together, a place where varieties of domestic, 
foreign, law enforcement, and military information can readily be 
combined, and where central coordination of a national community can be 
organized. If anything goes wrong, the spotlight will be on the President. 
It is up to him to set the expectations for the strong but balanced system 
we will need. But such a system cannot be based in or directed just from 
Washington. The President needs to set an expectation and design a 
system that is truly national and decentralized. [Emphasis added]86 
The greatest likely threat to the US today is not from other nation-states but from 
the threat of attack by transnational terrorists and terrorist groups.  The distinct homeland 
defense and homeland security mission of USNORTHCOM demands that its intelligence 
analysts focus on terrorism and counterterrorism analysis.  USNORTHCOM J2 was 
designed and manned with this problem set in mind, focused foreign intelligence from 
around the world as well as domestic intelligence and law enforcement information 
generated in the US when a nexus with transnational terrorism is established.  The 
organizational structure and manning of the USNORTHCOM J2 was developed with an 
eye toward the challenges inherent in counterterrorism analysis within both the 
Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities that have been articulated in this thesis.   
The USNORTHCOM J2 has a good mix of experienced counterterrorism analysts 
(master level experience), personnel trained in other areas of expertise but knowledgeable 
of analysis skills (journeyman level experience), and individuals new to both 
 
85 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 401. 
86 “Protecting America’s Freedom in the Information Age.” Report of the Markle Foundation Task 
Force on National Security in the Information Age, 10. 
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counterterrorism and to analysis (apprentice level experience).  This mix of analytic skills 
and experience ensures that the USNORTHCOM J2 can immediately provide quality 
counterterrorism analysis and support analysis at other organizations and agencies in both 
the Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities today.  At the same time, this mix of 
experienced analysts with apprentice level newcomers provides for the development of 
analytic skills for the new analysts, ensuring the continued training, education and 

























                                                
VI. “A MORE PERFECT UNION…” THE FUTURE FOR 
USNORTHCOM INTELLIGENCE  
A. BRINGING LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION TO USNORTHCOM 
J2 
The tragedy of 9/11 forced the Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities to 
reevaluate their information sharing practices.  The nature of the threat today is such that 
there cannot be a dichotomy between the two communities with regard to information; all 
available relevant intelligence information from one community must be shared with the 
other in order to generate the most comprehensive analysis of the potential threat to our 
homeland.  It is essential for all available information, whether it is from the Law 
Enforcement Community or the Intelligence Community, to be freely shared to every 
counterterrorism analyst.  This has become the analytic imperative because 
“[i]ntelligence and law enforcement are becoming increasingly intertwined.  Few doubt 
that valuable insights can derive from close correlation of information from differing 
intelligence and law enforcement sources.” 87 
USNORTHCOM was created to provide the President and the Secretary of 
Defense a single point of contact to marshal military forces against threats to the 
homeland; to be the military’s primary leader in homeland defense and lead when called 
upon for homeland security.  As the DoD’s (and the country’s) leader in homeland 
defense, its intelligence unit, the USNORTHCOM J2, must have access to all available 
information to provide the Commander and his assigned forces the best analysis of the 
threat.  Patrick Hughes, Under Secretary for Intelligence Analysis and Infrastructure 
Portection for the Department of Homeland Security and former Director of the Defense 
Intelligence Agency and stated in 2002, “The key to the success of the people that do the 
work of intelligence is access to information.  
 
 
87 Best, Intelligence to Counter Terrorism:  Issues for Congress, 19. 
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Intelligence sharing across the Intelligence Community, Federal, State, and local, is vital. 
Without open and expeditious sharing of intelligence, I believe this endeavor will fail.” 88 
 
B. KEY POINTS FOR INFORMATION SHARING WITH USNORTHCOM 
J2 
This thesis has tried to address several challenges to the sharing of information 
between the Law Enforcement Community and the Intelligence Community, and more 
importantly, to the counterterrorism analysts in the USNORTHCOM J2.  These 
challenges, and in some cases misconceptions, need to be addressed and overcome so that 
all counterterrorism analysts in the Intelligence Community, and more specifically those 
in the USNORTHCOM J2, can have access to all available information, both foreign and 
domestic intelligence as it relates to transnational terrorism and threats to the homeland, 
so that all-source analysis can be produced and disseminated to senior decision makers. 
 
1. Develop the “Need to Share” 
The environment for sharing information across the two communities must be 
fostered.  Cultural challenges must be overcome, engraining the spirit of “need to share” 
and not creating barriers based on an abstract and outdated concept of “need to know.”  
The protection of sources of methods should be paramount and always considered when 
deciding what needs to be shared with all levels of government and across the 
communities, but it should not become a barrier for, or an excuse in not sharing 
intelligence.   
 
2. Properly Define the “Reason to Believe” 
Part of the two step process to determine what domestic intelligence and law 
enforcement information can be passed to military intelligence organization such as 
USNORTHCOM J2 is the determination of a nexus between a US Person and 
 
88 U.S. Congress, Senate.  Committee on Governmental Affairs.  Testimony of Lt. Gen Patrick M. 
Hughes, U.S. Army (Ret.), former Director (1996-1999), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), a review of 
the relationship between a Department of Homeland Security and the Intelligence Community Hearings.  
(107th Cong., 2d sess., 2002). 
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transnational terrorism.  The key to this determination is the definition of a “reason to 
believe” a US Person has a connection with terrorism.  A uniform definition, such as the  
one used by USNORTHCOM J2, needs to be adopted across both the Intelligence and 
Law Enforcement Communities so that an evenly applied standard can be used to assist 
information sharing. 
 
3. Stop the “Diffusion of Skills” by Incorporating USNORTHCOM J2 
The refocusing of much of the Intelligence Community towards counterterrorism 
analysis has created a diffusion of analytic talent.  This strain on available analytic 
resources may result in inaccurate and not well-developed analysis.  The 
USNORTHCOM J2 brings to the Intelligence Community an established analytic 
capability.  Analysis is the primary product of the organization and its primary 
contribution to both homeland security and homeland defense.  The USNORTHCOM J2 
can provide high quality and experienced counterterrorism analysts to support the 
analytic efforts of the rest of the Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities today.  
It can only support these two communities, however, if it has access to all available 
information, including domestic intelligence and law enforcement information.  Only 
then can a true all-source, fused intelligence product be created. 
 
4. The Department of Homeland Security and the National 
Counterterrosim Center 
This thesis has concentrated primarily on the need to share law enforcement 
information with counterterrorism intelligence analysts, focusing primarily on those 
analysts at USNORTHCOM.  Although implied from the larger context for the need to 
share information with all organizations focused on counterterrorism, the thesis did not 
try to specifically address the information needs of the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS).  It must be mentioned, however, that DHS also needs to be able to receive both 
traditional and non-traditional intelligence information in order to fuse it into one 
coherent analytic product.  DHS has a formal liaison relationship with USNORTHCOM, 
but has only informal analyst-to-analyst relationships each others intelligence 
directorates. 
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As was mentioned in Chapter V, the NCTC was created as a follow on 
organization to the TTIC to integrating and fusing all available counterterrorism 
intelligence in support of the President and the national leadership inside Washington, 
DC.  USNORTHCOM J2 has developed direct informal relationships with the NCTC at 
senior leadership level as well as the analyst-to-analyst level.  In addition, 
USNORTHCOM J2 has a direct liaison representative on the DIA’s Joint Intelligence 
Task Force – Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT) Force Protection Unit which is a 
department within the NCTC.   
The question remains unanswered: which agency should be the lead for homeland 
security intelligence for the entire country?  DHS’s Intelligence Analysis and 
Infrastructure Protection Division (IAIP) was conceived and chartered with that purpose 
in mind, but is the organization itself and the two communities that hold the information 
(Intelligence and Law Enforcement) structured to make this happen?  Has the creation of 
first the TTIC, and now its successor the NCTC, made the concept of the IAIP obsolete 
before it has a chance to become established?  Should the FBI retain domestic 
intelligence responsibilities in addition to its law enforcement roles and missions?  These 
questions although worthy of in-depth analysis and research, are beyond the scope of this 
paper but remain important in future discussions of homeland security intelligence.  Do 
we have it right or can we do it better?  USNORTHCOM J2 remains engaged with each 
of these agencies at the analyst level, but it may need to establish more permanent 
positions to further the coordination and cooperation between USNORTHCOM and those 
agencies that have domestic intelligence analytic responsibilities. 
 
C. FINAL THOUGHTS 
Many changes and reforms have been implemented since the attacks 9/11, 
including changes made by specific agencies trying to create change of their own 
practices and procedures, reforms dictated to the two communities by the Executive 
Branch, and legislation passed by Congress instituting reforms.  However, these changes 
will take time to develop and imbed themselves into the cultures of the two communities 
and the organizations that make them up.  As the changes become an integral part of day-
to-day activity and transform the Intelligence and Law Enforcement Community’s culture 
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and relationships, it it stands to reason that the rest of the Intelligence Community take 
advantage of the creation and readily available pool of counterterrorism analysts at the 
USNORTHCOM J2 by increasing their access to non-traditional intelligence.  The 
freeing up of more information and letting it flow out of the FBI and the rest of the Law 
Enforcement Community to USNORTHCOM J2 analysts will allow the critical job of 
all-source, fusion analysis to grow and continue while these changes to the FBI culture 
and organization take hold.  This allows the most important mission of fused 
counterterrorism analysis of all available information to continue, to be able to detect, 
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